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DEMOCRACY-ASSISTING JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE CHALLENGE OF PARTISAN POLARIZATION
Terri Peretti*
INTRODUCTION
A new theme has emerged in scholarly commentary on the U.S. Supreme
Court and its role in American democracy. 1 This theme, which this Article calls
“democracy-assisting judicial review,” emphasizes the Court’s ability to offset or
compensate for democratic deficits found in the other branches of government.
With American policy-making increasingly plagued by polarization and gridlock,
assessing the Court’s ability to overcome democratic dysfunctions is an important
task. This Article seeks to contribute to this discussion by analyzing the potential
for democracy-assisting judicial review and discussing reforms that might enhance
the Court’s capacity to meet the challenge of today’s polarized politics.
Part I of this Article explains the idea of democracy-assisting judicial review
as expressed by several scholars, including, most recently, Professor Corinna
Lain. 2 Part II lays out a mostly negative assessment of this notion that courts can
save the people from their democracy’s failings. It observes the dominance in
American politics of interbranch partisan strategies that include the Court, which
thereby limit the Court’s independence and, thus, its ability and desire to play a
democracy-assisting role. This “regime politics” perspective, as the Article argues,
enhances our understanding of Supreme Court decision making, even in a doctrinal
area typically seen as a classic example of democracy-assisting judicial review—
reapportionment. Part III discusses how the rise of partisan polarization increases
the need for democracy-assisting judicial review while reducing the Court’s
capacity to provide it, with recent election-law decisions offering persuasive
evidence. Part IV examines a variety of reforms that might improve how electoral
and partisan forces shape the Court and enhance constitutional consensus building
in these polarized times.
I. DEMOCRACY-ASSISTING JUDICIAL REVIEW
Professor Alexander Bickel claimed that judicial review is, problematically, a
deviant institution that inevitably blocks majority will. 3 His “counter-majoritarian
* © 2014 Terri Peretti. Professor of Political Science at Santa Clara University.
Comments and questions can be sent to the author at tperetti@scu.edu.
1
“Re-emerged” is probably a more accurate term given John Hart Ely’s argument that
judges should protect and enhance the democratic process. See generally JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
2
Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113 (2012).
3
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (1962).
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difficulty” construct dominated normative constitutional debate for decades. The
contrary idea that courts can actually enhance democracy or advance majority will,
thus, is unexpected and requires explanation. What follows is a brief review of the
work of several different scholars who have advanced a democracy-assisting role
for courts, with a more in-depth summary provided for the most recent
contribution by Professor Lain. 4
A. Representation-Reinforcing Judicial Review
It is impossible to begin a discussion of how courts can improve the
functioning of American democracy without mentioning John Hart Ely. His
process-perfecting or “representation-reinforcing” theory of judicial review
famously argued that the Supreme Court’s sole legitimate role is to correct
malfunctions in the democratic process. 5 Instead of imposing substantive values in
opposition to majority preferences, the Court should merely act as “a referee . . .
interven[ing] only when one team is gaining an unfair advantage, not because the
‘wrong’ team has scored.” 6 This approach, Ely argues, is more consistent with the
U.S. Constitution (which is mostly concerned with process), with democracy
(since the Court is helping the people express and enforce their preferences), and
with judicial capacity (as judges are “outsiders” who can better detect and correct
political malfunctions). 7
Ely instructs the Court to engage in two types of representation-reinforcing
activities. First, judicial review can legitimately be used to “facilitat[e] the
representation of minorities” 8 by striking down laws resulting from legislators’
prejudice or indifference. The Court also should act to “clear[] the channels of
political change” by vigorously protecting free speech and the right to vote,
ensuring equal and effective representation, and holding legislators responsible for
making tough policy choices. 9 Using these guides, Ely praises the Warren Court,
particularly its reapportionment and civil rights decisions, and criticizes the Burger
Court’s Roe v. Wade 10 decision that imposed substantive, rather than
participational, values. 11
B. Upside-Down Judicial Review

her

Professor Lain makes no such distinction between process and substance in
“upside-down” account of judicial review. 12 Turning Bickel’s
4

Lain, supra note 2.
ELY, supra note 1, at 102–04.
6
Id. at 103.
7
See id. at 90–104.
8
Id. at 135.
9
Id. at 105, 132–33.
10
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11
ELY, supra note 1, at 73–75, 144–49.
12
Lain, supra note 2, at 175.
5
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“countermajoritarian difficulty on its head,” 13 she emphasizes the Court’s ability to
vindicate majority preferences that have been denied by a malfunctioning
legislative process. 14 Central to this argument is her reversal of the institutional
roles assigned by Bickel, suggesting that “the branches most majoritarian in theory
may be least majoritarian in practice” and “the branch least majoritarian in theory
may be most majoritarian in practice.” 15 With regard to the former, she disputes
the democratic pedigree of policies enacted by the elective branches due to a
variety of impediments that are structural (e.g., the electoral college and equal state
representation in the Senate), functional (e.g., the filibuster and congressional
committee system), political (e.g., interest group influence and soaring incumbent
reelection rates), and topic-specific (e.g., avoidance of issues that are “too hot” or
“too cold”). 16 Most of these impediments, Lain notes, “favor inertia, rendering it
difficult both to pass majoritarian legislation and to repeal legislation that has later
lost majoritarian backing.” 17
With regard to the Court being the least majoritarian institution theoretically
but the most majoritarian in practice, Lain discusses various channels of
democratic influence on the Court. 18 Probably most important is an appointments
process in which elected officials with “mainstream policy preferences” select
Justices with similar “ideological leanings,” thereby ensuring that Justices will also
have mainstream policy preferences. 19 Unsurprisingly, the Court “has remained
relatively ideologically balanced for decades, and there is reason to think it may
well stay that way.” 20 Additionally, its lack of enforcement powers renders
political support for the Court and its decisions critically important. Furthermore,
Supreme Court Justices are a product of their time and, thus, can be expected to act
with “‘the main current of public sentiment’” rather than against it.21 There is also
“the gravitational pull of dominant public opinion,” a force to which the Court’s
moderate, swing Justices have been most responsive. 22 All of these factors help to
explain why “the Supreme Court, ironically enough, may be better positioned to
effectuate majoritarian change.” 23
Democratic impediments in the elected branches and majoritarian influences
on the Court both come into play in triggering the practice of upside-down judicial
review. As Lain describes this dynamic, “[w]hen widespread attitudes change but
the law does not, pressure builds to effectuate that change . . . . Free of the
13

Id. at 179.
Id. at 148, 179.
15
Id. at 145–46, 157.
16
Id. at 146–57.
17
Id. at 157.
18
Id. at 157–67.
19
Id. at 159.
20
Id. at 165.
21
Id. at 163–64 (quoting ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT
209 (2d ed. 1994)).
22
Id. at 164–65.
23
Id. at 183.
14
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legislative logjams that stymie the representative branches, and moved by
majoritarian proclivities of its own, the Court responds to, and reflects, prevailing
norms otherwise frustrated in the democratic process.” 24 The Court is not restricted
to perfecting democratic processes, as in Ely’s approach, but instead actually
“produc[es] majoritarian results.” 25
For supporting evidence, Lain examines three “classic cases of the
countermajoritarian difficulty” 26—Brown v. Board of Education, 27 Furman v.
Georgia, 28 and Roe v. Wade—and portrays them instead as examples of upsidedown judicial review. Brown “presents a striking example of the Supreme Court
responding to, and reflecting, deep shifts in prevailing norms when the democratic
process would not.” 29 Even though Furman struck down the death penalty laws of
thirty-nine states and the federal government and was repudiated by subsequent
legislation in thirty-five states, there was considerable evidence that the justices
“were applying[] upside-down judicial review.” 30 Majority support for capital
punishment seemed to be disappearing, and the death penalty had fallen into
disuse, with prosecutors rarely willing to seek it and juries rarely willing to impose
it, except for executions in the South administered primarily against poor blacks. 31
With Roe, Lain says, the Court actually sided with majority sentiment in opposing
harsh, century-old abortion restrictions and more recent and modest abortion
regulations, neither of which commanded public support by 1973. 32 Additionally,
the Catholic-led right-to-life lobby was successful in stalling legislative efforts to
repeal existing laws, leading politicians to be greatly relieved when the Court took
this divisive issue off their hands. 33 Although these are only three examples, they
obviously are important ones, and in Lain’s view, they are not exceptional.
“Upside-down judicial review happens, and it happens enough to merit
consideration in our normative theorizing about judicial review.” 34
Lain’s normative appraisal of upside-down judicial review is mixed because
“[s]ome problems it makes better, others it makes worse.” 35 She expresses concern
about the Court intruding on states’ prerogatives and weakening federalism,
imposing majoritarian values instead of constitutional principles, and enabling
24

Id. at 168.
Id. at 117.
26
Id.
27
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
29
Lain, supra note 2, at 125.
30
Id. at 132.
31
Id. at 126–30.
32
Id. at 135–37 (citing public opinion poll data to demonstrate support for elective
abortions and hypothesizing that public support was due to archaic laws that endangered
women who sought abortions).
33
Id. at 139–43; see also id. at 143 (“The Supreme Court in Roe had indeed taken an
issue from the legislature—but it was not an issue that the legislature wanted to keep.”).
34
Id. at 178.
35
Id. at 179.
25
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politicians to avoid responsibility. 36 In the end, however, her assessment is
positive: the Court “facilitates” rather than “thwarts” majority will so that “in an
unexpected and upside-down way, democracy never worked so well.” 37
C. Majoritarian Judicial Review
Lain is not alone in highlighting the Supreme Court’s ability to enhance
American democracy. Professors Barry Friedman and Jeffrey Rosen have both
portrayed the Court as an institution that is highly capable of satisfying the people
with its majoritarian judgments. Friedman emphasizes the “dialogic system of
determining constitutional meaning” in which the Court’s decisions align with
public opinion “over time.” 38 For Rosen, the judiciary is “the most democratic
branch” and, “[f]ar from protecting minorities against the tyranny of the majority
or thwarting the will of the people, courts for most of American history have
tended to reflect the constitutional views of majorities.” 39 Courts, furthermore, are
most successful when practicing “democratic constitutionalism” and deferring to
the public’s views. 40 This is especially important today as a polarized Congress no
longer “court[s] the moderate center” and seeks to enlist the judiciary in their
extremist causes. 41 Judges must, in Rosen’s view, resist this “invitation to
unilateralism” because “[t]he courts can best serve the country in the future as they
have served it in the past: by reflecting and enforcing the constitutional views of
the American people.” 42
D. Second-Best Constitutionalism
A somewhat different type of democracy-assisting judicial review comes from
Professor Adrian Vermuele. His idea of “second-best constitutionalism” permits
courts to tolerate a particular constitutional defect or imperfection if it compensates
for another imperfection and helps to bring the nation closer to a constitutional
ideal. 43 For example, while the legislative veto may not be constitutionally
sanctioned by literalism or originalism, it could nevertheless be supported as an
effective offset for another entrenched constitutional deformity: excessive
legislative delegation of power to the executive branch. While neither excessive
36

Id. at 179–81.
Id. at 179.
38
BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 382
(2009).
39
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE
AMERICA xii (2006).
40
Id. at 210.
41
Id. at 4.
42
Id. at 210.
43
Adrian Vermuele, Hume’s Second-Best Constitutionalism, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 421,
426 (2003).
37
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delegations nor legislative vetoes are preferred, having both more effectively
achieves the constitutional goal of balanced power between Congress and the
executive. Vermuele expresses some concerns about second-best constitutionalism,
particularly the pursuit of constitutional goals through unconstitutional means and
the capacity of judges to assess second-best constitutional arguments. However,
like Lain, Rosen, and Friedman, he believes that courts can enhance the operation
and performance of American democracy and, thus, accepts the possibility of
defensible, democracy-assisting judicial review. 44
II. DEMOCRACY-ASSISTING REVIEW, REGIME POLITICS, AND THE CASE OF
REAPPORTIONMENT
This Article applauds the efforts of scholars like Lain and Rosen to challenge
the countermajoritarian difficulty and think more realistically about the actual role
the Supreme Court plays in the American political system. However, these works
do not go far enough. Most importantly, they fail to acknowledge the critical role
of interbranch partisan strategies in American policy making. Because these
strategies include the Supreme Court, its independence and the likelihood of its
acting in a democracy-assisting manner are reduced. As this Article explains, the
regime-politics approach places interbranch partisan activities at its center, helping
to provide a more complete understanding of the Court’s decisions. This will be
demonstrated in a doctrinal area that is typically seen as a model of democracyassisting judicial review—reapportionment.
A. The Regime-Politics Approach
Regime politics is a school of thought claiming that judicial review is
politically constructed. 45 In other words, politicians seek to enhance the regime’s
electoral and policy success by carefully structuring, empowering, and populating
courts. As Professor Mark Graber explains,
Elected officials sponsor judicial review by establishing and expanding
federal jurisdiction, by nominating and confirming justices known to be
willing to declare laws unconstitutional, by easing access to courts and
providing resources to litigants who are making constitutional attacks on
courts, by adopting procedures that enable litigants to discover and prove
constitutional violations, by adopting vague statutory language that must

44

Id. at 436.
See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY (2007); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative
Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 36–37 (1993); Keith E.
Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of
Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583, 593–94
(2005) [hereinafter Political Supports].
45
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be interpreted by courts, and by refusing to pass anticourt legislation in
response to public attacks on courts. 46
According to this view, constitutional law becomes a collaborative project,
with courts crafting legal doctrines that aid and advance the ideological
commitments they share with their partisan allies in the other branches. Judicial
assistance can come in a variety of forms:
Justices impose majoritarian policies on outlier states, provide insurance
when dominant coalitions suffer electoral defeats, enable elected officials
to avoid taking firm stands on hotly contested political issues, provide a
policymaking alternative when elected institutions are gridlocked,
resolve issues lacking the political salience necessary to attract
legislative attention, and facilitate position taking by announcing policies
that crucial elites support but cannot publicly endorse. 47
Given that the American political system is highly fragmented and replete with
veto points that enable obstruction, the opportunities for judicial assistance are
abundant.
Evidence supporting the regime-politics model comes mostly from case
studies that reinterpret significant episodes in constitutional history. Professor
Howard Gillman, for example, has described the efforts of the Republican Party in
the post-bellum period to transform federal policy and institutions to facilitate
national economic development; in the face of electoral vulnerability, they
entrenched their economic policy preferences by enhancing the power of federal
courts and staffing them with conservatives. 48 Professor Martin Shapiro has
characterized Carolene Products’ Footnote Four as a New Deal political bargain
dressed up in constitutional language; after all, it directs courts to withhold
assistance from New Deal enemies (businesses) and to extend it to New Deal allies
(left-leaning intellectuals, racial and ethnic minorities, and the voting masses). 49
My previous research shows that the Court’s state-action doctrine in the midtwentieth century developed in collaboration with Democratic Party leaders,
especially in the executive branch. The Court first stretched state-action rules in
order to reach and forbid private race discrimination (e.g., in primary elections and
housing); it then tightened them once the Democratic Party freed itself from
conservative Southern control, enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and no longer

46

Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to Congress to
Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361, 364 (2008).
47
Id.
48
Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their
Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511,
521–22 (2002).
49
Martin M. Shapiro, The Constitution and Economic Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 74, 85 (M. Judd Harmon ed., 1978).
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needed the Court’s assistance to accomplish its policy goals. 50 Professor Kevin
McMahon explains how President Richard Nixon successfully shifted the Supreme
Court in a conservative direction on the issues of greatest concern to him—busing
and law and order—as part of his electoral strategy of rebuilding the Republican
coalition by appealing to conservative whites in the South and working-class
Catholics in the urban Northeast. 51 More recent work by Professors Cornell
Clayton, J. Mitchell Pickerill, and Lucas McMillan has documented how the “New
Right Republican regime,” beginning with President Nixon’s election in 1968 and
consolidated with President Reagan’s two victories, employed a broad and
intensive judicial strategy seeking conservative legal outcomes on a variety of
issues like criminal justice, federalism, religion, abortion, and affirmative action. 52
Scholars in the comparative law field also have offered evidence that the political
construction of judicial review is not a uniquely American phenomenon. 53 Elites in
emerging democracies also empower and shape courts as a way to consolidate and
protect their power. 54
The activities of courts in these regime-politics accounts represent “friendly”
judicial review, rather than majoritarian judicial review. This is an important
distinction. Rather than acting independently to vindicate majority will in the face
of legislative failure, courts have advanced the goals and interests of the partisan
regime of which they are a part. The fact that their decisions were often consistent
with majority preferences is unsurprising since party regimes attain power by
winning popular support. Any congruence with public opinion, however, is
incidental and a product of the Court’s political dependence rather than its political
independence.
B. The Case of Reapportionment
A closer look at constitutional developments in the reapportionment field
helps to demonstrate these points. The Court’s reapportionment decisions are often
presented as a classic tale of democracy-assisting judicial review. In Baker v.

50

Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940–1990, 35 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 273, 274–75 (2010).
51
KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL LIBERALISM
AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 148–49 (2011).
52
Cornell W. Clayton & Lucas K. McMillan, The Roberts Court in an Era of
Polarized Politics, 10 FORUM J. APPLIED RES. CONTEMP. POL. 132, 132–33 (2013); Cornell
W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice: How the New Right
Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court’s Criminal Justice Jurisprudence, 94 GEO. L.J. 1385,
1386–87 (2006); see also J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The Rehnquist Court
and the Political Dynamics of Federalism, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 233, 240–41 (2004).
53
TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 3 (2003).
54
See id. at 17–21; RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARD JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 11–12 (2004).
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Carr, 55 the Supreme Court intervened reluctantly, problematically, but out of
necessity, to compensate for a deeply rooted malfunction in the political process
and sought to achieve higher constitutional ideals of fair representation and
political equality. 56 This account is incomplete, however, failing to answer critical
questions regarding the particular timing of the Court’s intervention and its
strongly egalitarian character. A regime-politics perspective that highlights
interbranch partisan strategies is better able to answer those questions.
The now-familiar story begins in 1946, with Colegrove v. Green. 57 There, the
Supreme Court rejected a challenge to Illinois’s congressional districts that gave
voters in the most populous district one-ninth the voting power of those in the
smallest district. 58 It dismissed the complaint in a 4–3 vote, with Justice
Frankfurter asserting that it was “hostile to a democratic system to involve the
judiciary in the politics of the people” and famously warning that courts “ought not
to enter this political thicket.” 59 He advised underrepresented urban residents to
pursue reform through the ballot box and the political process, not the courts. 60 A
dramatic change occurred in 1962 in Baker v. Carr. Memphis residents had
claimed a denial of equal protection due to the Tennessee legislature’s failure to
redistrict, despite major population shifts since the last redistricting in 1901 that
rendered their vote one-tenth the value of that of rural residents. 61 After a lengthy
and discordant decision-making process, 62 the Court ruled in a 6–2 vote that
malapportionment was indeed a justiciable issue. 63 Justice Clark initially sided
with Justice Frankfurter but switched his vote because, as explained in his
concurrence, voters had no practical avenues for reform and were “caught up in a
legislative strait jacket.” 64 Tennessee had no initiative or referendum,
55

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
See id. at 236–37.
57
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
58
Id. at 556; id. at 569 (Black, J., dissenting).
59
Id. at 553–54, 556.
60
See id. at 556.
61
Id. at 193–95.
62
Some accounts credit the Baker case for Justice Whittaker’s health problems and
early retirement, and Justice Frankfurter reportedly blamed Baker for the two strokes he
suffered fewer than two weeks later. See, e.g., Kim I. Esler, A Defense of Activism, 40
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 911, 920 n.25 (1996) (“Whittaker quit and Frankfurter suffered
a stroke, presumably related to the stress of the defeat.”); Carlo A. Pedrioli, Instrumentalist
and Holmesian Voices in the Rhetoric of Reapportionment: The Opinions of Justices
Brennan and Frankfurter in Baker v. Carr, 4 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 31 n.327 (2013)
(“According to Solicitor General Archibald Cox, a former mentee of Justice Frankfurter,
Frankfurter expressed to Cox that Baker had been responsible for the justice’s deteriorating
health.”).
63
Baker, 369 U.S. at 237.
64
Id. at 259 (Clark, J., concurring); Memorandum from Justice Tom C. Clark to
Justice Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 7, 1962), available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/clark/vie
w_doc.php?id=a120-02-02 (explaining the decision not to join the dissent in Baker v.
Carr).
56
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constitutional conventions could only be called by the legislature, and state courts
had refused to intervene. 65
Questions quickly emerged over an appropriate judicial remedy, with the
Court providing considerable clarity by 1964. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 66 the Court
interpreted the requirement in Article I, Section 2, that representatives be chosen
“by the People of the several States” to mean that “as nearly as is practicable[,] one
man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.” 67
Thus, House districts were bound by the “one person, one vote” principle of equal
representation. In Reynolds v. Sims, 68 the Court extended this principle to state
legislatures, requiring districts in both houses to be “as nearly of equal population
as is practicable.” 69 Even when overwhelmingly approved by voters themselves,
deviation from this standard was not allowed. 70 The Court additionally required a
very high degree of mathematical precision in the drawing of legislative districts,
at least for the House of Representatives. For example, it struck down a plan in
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler 71 with an average interdistrict disparity of 1.6% 72 and
another in Karcher v. Daggett 73 where the largest disparity was 0.7%. 74 The
Court’s remedy was clearly and strictly egalitarian.
Baker and its progeny appear to be a good fit for a democracy-assisting
judicial review framework. First, there clearly existed an entrenched democratic
malfunction. Massive migration had occurred from rural to urban areas in the first
half of the twentieth century, and the traditional approach of representing
geographic entities, such as towns and counties, produced severe
malapportionment. 75 Additionally, legislative incumbents and their rural
constituencies had no incentive to address this problem, and “inequities in
representation . . . widened substantially;” in fact, the largest interdistrict disparity
in terms of representation per resident grew “from 6 to 1 in 1910 to 20 to 1 in
1950, and then to 35 to 1 in 1960.” 76 Legislatures at the mid-twentieth century
mark were, as Professor Lucas Powe writes, “ruled ‘by the hog lot and the cow
65

Baker, 369 U.S. at 259 (Clark, J., concurring).
376 U.S. 1 (1964).
67
Id. at 7–8.
68
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
69
Id. at 577.
70
See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 739 (1964)
(holding that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees an individual’s right to cast an equally
weighted vote, even though the majority of Colorado’s electorate approved the
apportionment scheme).
71
394 U.S. 526 (1969).
72
Id. at 529 n.1.
73
462 U.S. 725 (1983).
74
Id. at 728.
75
See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY:
ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 39–40
(2008).
76
Id. at 31.
66
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pasture.’” 77 The policy consequences were predictable: significantly lower per
capita state spending in metropolitan areas and a nationwide failure to address
pressing urban problems involving race, poverty, education, and housing. 78
Federal court intervention was seen as an imperfect but necessary “secondbest” solution, with the Court itself employing democracy-assisting language in
defending its decisions.
We are cautioned about the dangers of entering into political thickets and
mathematical quagmires. Our answer is this: a denial of constitutionally
protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our office
require no less of us. . . . To the extent that a citizen’s right to vote is
debased, he is that much less a citizen. . . . A nation once primarily rural
in character becomes predominantly urban. Representation schemes once
fair and equitable become archaic and outdated. But the basic principle
of representative government remains . . . the weight of a citizen’s vote
cannot be made to depend on where he lives. . . . This is an essential part
of the concept of a government of laws and not men. This is at the heart
of Lincoln’s vision of “government of the people, by the people, [and]
for the people.” 79
Rather than careful analysis rooted in the text and its original meaning, the postBaker cases offered the irrefutable logic of democratic principles. In Reynolds, for
example, Chief Justice Earl Warren explained that it was only “logical[]” and
“reasonable that a majority of the people of a State could elect a majority of that
State’s legislators.” 80 Similarly, given that “the right to elect legislators in a free
and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system,” it was
“inconceivable” that a state law that in effect multiplies some citizens’ votes “by
two, five, or 10 . . . could be constitutionally sustainable.” 81 Justice John Marshall
Harlan’s persuasive historical analysis to the contrary would not stand in the way
of such inexorable democratic commands.
The Court’s revolutionary reapportionment decisions were quickly accepted
and widely praised. By 1967, “every state had complied with the philosophy
expressed by the Court . . . [and] adopted state legislative and U.S. House districts
with nearly equal populations.” 82 Improved representational accuracy in turn
helped to bring about a more equitable distribution of revenues within states and an
increase in education and welfare spending in the Midwest and Northeast. 83
Perhaps it is not surprising then that former Chief Justice Earl Warren spoke of
77

LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 200 (2000)
(citation omitted).
78
See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 75, at 89–90.
79
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566–68 (1964).
80
Id. at 565.
81
Id. at 562.
82
ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 75, at 95.
83
Id. at 233–38.
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Baker v. Carr as the “most important case of my tenure on the Court.” 84 The Court
has also received mostly positive marks from legal scholars, including Ely, who
regarded malapportionment as precisely the sort of representational defect the
Court should correct, and Rosen, who viewed the Court’s efforts to “break the
political logjam” over redistricting as evidence of its “ability to promote
democracy.” 85
The democracy-assisting version of the reapportionment story has limitations,
however. For example, it fails to help us answer a simple but important question:
why 1962, rather than 1952 or 1942 or 1932 or 1922? After all, malapportionment
was a serious nationwide problem well before 1962. In fact, Congress failed to
reapportion House seats after the 1920 census, which had revealed majority status
for urban residents for the first time in history. 86 Malapportionment then worsened
considerably over the next four decades and existed in the House of
Representatives and in nearly every state legislative house.87 Why, then, had the
Court waited until the 1960s to intercede and employ democracy-assisting review?
And why did it choose such a strict egalitarian standard, despite the existence of
“the federal analogy” (i.e., the Senate) and the absence of a clear equality mandate
from the Constitution’s text and history?
The Court’s timing and its egalitarianism make sense, however, when we
adopt a regime-politics lens and reflect on the electoral success, policy aims, and
interbranch strategies of the Democratic regime. From 1932 through 1964, the
Democratic Party experienced extraordinary success in national elections, winning
the White House seven out of nine times and control of both houses of Congress
sixteen out of eighteen times. 88 That success paid off handsomely in terms of
partisan control of the judiciary. Especially relevant to the timing issue, President
Kennedy’s replacement in 1962 of Justice Charles Whittaker with Justice Byron
White and Justice Felix Frankfurter with Justice Arthur Goldberg had an enormous
impact on the ideological composition and direction of the Supreme Court. The
percentage of conservative decisions made by the Court fell from 42% in the 1960
term to 22% in the 1962 term. 89 Using Martin-Quinn ideology scores (with
negative numbers indicating a liberal orientation and positive numbers indicating a
conservative orientation), the ideological location and identity of the median
Justice changed dramatically from 0.533 (Justice Stewart) in the 1960 term
to -0.046 (Justice White) in the 1961 term, to -0.808 (Justice Goldberg) in the 1962

84

EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 306 (1977).
ELY, supra note 1, at 77–88, 116–25; ROSEN, supra note 39, at 126.
86
ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 75, at 39 (“In 1920, for the first time, the
Census counted more people in cities than in farms and rural towns.”).
87
See id. at 30–31.
88
Republicans won the presidential election in 1952 and 1956 and control of both
houses of Congress in 1946 and 1952. THE CONCISE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 469–70 (Michael Kazin et al. eds., 2011).
89
Analysis Specifications, SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://www.scdb.wustl.edu/an
alysis.php (allowing analysis of case outcomes by term) (last visited Apr. 23, 2014).
85

2014]

DEMOCRACY-ASSISTING JUDICIAL REVIEW

855

term, and to -0.874 (Justice Brennan) in the 1963 term. 90 The Court’s strong shift
to the left should not be a surprise, given Democratic domination at the polls and,
thus, Democratic control of judicial appointments.
The timing of the Court’s intervention also makes sense when we look at the
leadership and cooperation of the Kennedy administration with respect to
redistricting. President Kennedy made “the crisis of the cities” an important part of
his presidential campaign, and he wooed the urban vote, beginning when he was a
senator in the late 1950s. 91 He claimed that the litany of ills plaguing America’s
cities—crime, poverty, overcrowding, scarce housing, and inferior education—
were caused by “political discrimination” against and underrepresentation of the
urban majority. 92 Once in power, President Kennedy lent support to the
reapportionment cause. One of the lawyers in the Baker case knew Attorney
General Robert Kennedy and had worked with Solicitor General Archibald Cox on
President Kennedy’s presidential campaign. 93 The Baker attorneys had hoped, but
were unable, to discuss their case and cause with Attorney General Kennedy. 94
They nonetheless had a lengthy meeting with Solicitor General Cox and Deputy
Attorney General Byron White. 95 After discussing the matter with the Attorney
General, Cox decided to file an amicus brief in the Baker case. 96
The Kennedy administration vigorously argued in Baker for judicial
assistance in correcting the representational distortions created by legislators’
refusal to redistrict and offered enthusiastic support for the ruling after the decision
was made. 97 President Kennedy expressed his approval of Baker at his first press
conference following the decision, reminding the public and press that his
administration had urged the Court to do the right thing and intervene since “the
right to fair representation and to have each vote counted equally is, it seems to
me, basic to the successful operation of a democracy.” 98 Other executive branch
officials publicly praised the ruling as well, including Robert Kennedy, who stated

90

These data come from The 2012 Justice Data Files compiled by Professors Martin
and Quinn, available at http://mqscores.wustl.edu/media/2012/justices.xls. Martin-Quinn
scores provide a widely used measure of judicial ideology. Their Bayesian model generates
ideal point estimates for each Justice that are dynamic—varying for each term—and which
are derived from the Justices’ actual votes and inferred from the patterns of voting
coalitions. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS
134, 145–52 (2002); Martin-Quinn Scores, WASH. U., http://mqscores.wustl.edu/measures.
php (last visited Apr. 23, 2014).
91
See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 75, at 89.
92
John F. Kennedy, The Shame of the States, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 18, 1958, at 12,
37.
93
ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 75, at 1, 4.
94
Id. at 4.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 5.
97
Whittington, Political Supports, supra note 45, at 588–89.
98
Id. at 589.

856

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

that Baker was “a landmark in the development of representative government.” 99
The administration stayed active in the reapportionment litigation that followed,100
and President Kennedy’s view that each vote should count equally became Court
doctrine.
Baker, Wesberry, and Reynolds are indeed majoritarian decisions, but not in
the sense employed by Lain and Rosen. The Court did not respond directly to
popular pressure or seek, virtuously and independently, to vindicate democratic
values. Rosen’s complaint that the Court need not have been so rigidly egalitarian
and could have used the Guarantee Clause to open a dialogue with state
legislatures 101 shows his misreading of the Court’s policy interventions in this area.
By 1964, the Court consisted solidly of active and loyal members of the dominant
Democratic regime. As Powe puts it, the Warren Court was “a functioning part of
the Kennedy-Johnson liberalism” 102 pursuing civil rights and the Great Society and
battling Southern outliers on issues of race, religion, and criminal justice. Strict
equality, imposed by the judicial members of this broad, powerful, and united
Democratic coalition, should not be a surprising policy choice. Furthermore, and as
Whittington points out, Baker is not an example of the Court “simply acting on
behalf of popular majorities;” rather, it “cut[] through the ‘political thicket’”
assisting “liberal Democrats who had long chaffed [sic] at the legislative obstacle
posed by entrenched conservatives.” 103
Finally, the implementation and impact of the Court’s reapportionment
decisions had a decidedly Democratic cast, lending further support to a regimepolitics interpretation. Professors Gary Cox and Jonathan Katz found significant
effects resulting from the fact that redistricting plans were being evaluated and
supervised by federal judges, who mostly belonged to the Democratic Party (again,
a legacy of its longstanding electoral success). 104 With Baker, the Supreme Court
changed the strategic redistricting game by introducing a new player: federal court
judges. It was no longer the case that previous district lines would stay in place if
the legislature and governor could not agree to a new plan. Now a federal judge,
and most likely a Democratic judge, could impose a new plan. This “reversionary
outcome” affected the negotiation process, with the legislature sometimes agreeing
to a new plan to avoid a worse plan that a (probably) Democratic judge might
impose. 105 In the end, three factors—the Baker decision, a predominantly
Democratic federal judiciary, and the 1964 Democratic landslide—combined to
produce “the abrupt eradication of a 6% pro-Republican bias in the translation of
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congressional votes into seats outside the South.” 106 Professors Cox and Katz
convincingly portray judges, not as neutral democracy-assisting reformers, but as
regime allies in a strategic partisan game.
III. DEMOCRACY-ASSISTING REVIEW IN THE MODERN POLARIZED ERA
What accounts for the persistence of the idea of democracy-assisting judicial
review, given that it cannot adequately explain one of its presumably best
examples? The timing of its reemergence in constitutional commentary is neither
surprising nor accidental. The United States finds itself amid what many regard as
a severe political crisis, with polarization among partisan elites playing a central
role. 107 The hope that courts can resolve or ameliorate this crisis is understandable,
but it is futile given that polarized elites construct and shape those judicial
institutions. Recent election-law decisions are particularly instructive on this point.
A clear sign of the current political crisis is found in public opinion surveys
showing that three-quarters of Americans are “dissatisfied with the way things are
going in the United States at this time,” 108 and 14% of Americans approved of
Congress’s job performance in 2013, the lowest annual average since Gallup began
measuring it in 1974. 109 Many blame partisan polarization. 110 The two major
parties have become more internally united, while also becoming more
ideologically distant from each other.111 Put another way, there are very few
moderates left in Congress to help forge a path to legislative compromise. As a
result, many issues (most conspicuously, those involving the budget) spark heated
debate and intractable disputes, with Republicans and Democrats unable to reach
agreement and, at times, unwilling to talk to one another. The federal government
was forced to shut down for sixteen days in October 2013, and a disastrous
106
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financial default was narrowly averted with a last-minute extension of the federal
debt limit. 112 Polarization, divided government, and the Senate filibuster have
presented an extraordinary challenge even for ordinary lawmaking. Congressional
gridlock, in turn, has triggered additional problems for democratic governance,
including an increased likelihood of unilateral action by a frustrated president. 113
Whether these dysfunctions are a product of an increase in partisan polarization or
are constitutionally hardwired as some have argued, 114 there are few who do not
believe that the American political system is broken and in need of repair.
Given its traditional reputation for independence and impartiality, the
judiciary presents an appealing savior. A special democracy-assisting function
enables courts to rescue the people from their dysfunctional politics while easing
concerns about the democratic legitimacy of the court’s intervention. Relying on
the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, to save America from its polarized
politics, however, offers false hope. To the degree that the regime-politics model is
valid, the Court is an integral part of the partisan coalitions that dominate
American democracy, which means it is also an integral part of the polarized
politics that currently dominate American democracy. How, then, could it have the
capacity or motivation to fix the dysfunctional politics of which it is a part? 115
Recent election-law decisions are illustrative. Professor Garrett Epps claimed
that—whether in campaign finance, voting rights, or partisan gerrymandering—the
Roberts Court has significantly contributed to “the train wreck that is 21st century
American democracy. . . . [W]hen we lament polarization, the declining respect for
democracy, the bitterness of the national dialogue, the dominance of money in
politics, and the life-and-death struggle over the right to vote, we are lamenting
trends either born in or enabled by the Supreme Court.” 116 In support of Epps’
claim, there is Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 117 in which the
Court removed limits on independent campaign expenditures by corporations and
labor unions from the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act, allowing
112
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nearly a billion dollars of independent spending to flow into the 2012 election
process, half from super PACs and most invested in negative advertising. 118 In
Crawford v. Marion County Board of Elections, 119 the Court upheld Indiana’s
photo identification law and opened the floodgates for new voter identification
laws throughout the states. 120 And in Shelby County v. Holder, 121 the Court
effectively freed many states and localities of preclearance requirements under the
Voting Rights Act by striking down Section 4(b)’s preclearance coverage formula,
spawning new voting restrictions, particularly in the South. 122 It is difficult to
argue that the Roberts Court enhanced democracy with these decisions.
It is particularly difficult to claim that, with these decisions, the Roberts Court
acted to rescue the people from political dysfunction or partisan stalemate, as
suggested by Lain’s version of democracy-assisting judicial review. Regarding
Shelby County, for example, Congress had reauthorized the preclearance
requirements of the Voting Rights Act on four occasions, 123 including in 2006
when it extended Section 5 for another twenty-five years. 124 Whether motivated by
“racial entitlement” or not, 125 Congress voted overwhelmingly for the extension,
with a 92% affirmative vote in the House and a unanimous vote in the Senate. 126 In
contrast to this extraordinary congressional consensus, the Supreme Court’s vote
was sharply divided and highly partisan. The five Republican Justices, all
appointed by Republican presidents, voted to invalidate the preclearance coverage
formula, while the four Democratic Justices, all appointed by Democratic
presidents, voted to uphold it. 127
118

SAMUEL KERNELL ET AL., THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 667 (6th ed. 2014).
553 U.S. 181 (2008).
120
Id. at 203–05.
121
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
122
See id. at 2631.
123
Extensions were approved by Congress in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006. Id. at
2620–21.
124
See id. at 2621.
125
This was Justice Scalia’s controversial characterization at oral argument. See Sean
Lengell, Scalia ‘Racial’ Comment on Voting Rights Law Draws Fire, WASH. TIMES (Feb.
28, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/28/scalia-racial-comment-dra
ws-fire/.
126
152 CONG. REC. S8012 (daily ed. July 20, 2006); see also 152 CONG. REC. H5207
(daily ed. July 13, 2006) (reporting a vote count of 390 ayes, 33 nays, and 9 not voting);
Charles Babington, Voting Rights Act Extension Passes in Senate, 98 to 0, WASH. POST
(July 21, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/20/AR20
06072001217.html; Raymond Hernandez, After Challenges, House Approves Renewal of
Voting Act, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/14/washington/1
4rights.html?_r=0 (stating the House voted 390–33 to renew the expiring provisions of the
Voting Rights Act).
127
See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2617 (Roberts, C.J, delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a
concurring opinion. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan, JJ. joined.).
119

860

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

While the Court’s recent election-law decisions are difficult to characterize as
democracy-assisting, they are much easier to characterize as partisan. It certainly
appears that in Crawford, Citizens United, and Shelby County, a Republicandominated Court decided consistently with policy positions advanced by the
Republican Party, whether in its national platforms, amicus briefs, or legislative
proposals. 128 This is an unsurprising result of the fact that party elites do not
appoint democracy assisters to the bench. Especially in polarized times, politicians
will seek to appoint copartisans who share the party’s (increasingly off-center)
ideological commitments and believe in its (increasingly off-center) constitutional
vision. The Republican Party, furthermore, has over the last half-century strongly
featured judicial philosophy in its “party brand.” 129 In communicating that brand to
voters and supporters, Republican presidents have mostly nominated strong
conservatives to the Court—Warren Burger, William Rehnquist, Robert Bork,
Douglas Ginsburg, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, John Roberts, and Samuel
Alito. On rare occasion, they have made strategic mistakes, like Justices David
Souter and Harry Blackmun. They have sometimes chosen moderates, like Justices
Anthony Kennedy and John Paul Stevens, but only when forced to by a
Democratic Senate. The result today, factoring in the White House victories of
Presidents Clinton and Obama, is a Roberts Court that is both very conservative
and very divided—exactly like the electoral politics that produced it.130 Such a
Court is unlikely and unable to act as an external and independent mechanism for
fixing the dysfunctional politics of which it is a part.
IV. FINDING CONSTITUTIONAL CONSENSUS IN A POLARIZED POLITY
Given this reality, it seems wise to abandon the democracy-assisting idea and
focus instead on more pressing challenges for judicial review in a polarized polity.
One such challenge is how to protect the Court from being easily captured by
extreme and unrepresentative partisan elements, a concern echoed by Rosen. 131
Such a Court may risk its public legitimacy as it comes to look more and more like
Congress in that it, too, is sharply divided into two distinct and distant partisan
groupings. 132 Such a Court might also produce what Mark Graber calls
“constitutional yo-yos” or “dramatic swings in judicial policy making.” 133
128
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Partisan polarization threatens the ongoing (and endless) process of finding,
building, and expressing consensual constitutional values in the United States. An
important, though not exclusive, part of that process is the appointment of new
Supreme Court Justices. The way the Constitution structures judicial appointments
ensures that the party winning the White House and Senate also wins the right to
influence the Supreme Court. The opportunity to plant its constitutional vision on
the Court is one of its electoral prizes. 134 As popular preferences change and party
fortunes ebb and flow, new Justices and new viewpoints are added to the Court. If
a party is able to build a successful and durable electoral coalition, as the
Democratic Party did with its New Deal coalition, it will be able to exert
significant control over the courts and secure its desired constitutional policies.
The problem with partisan polarization is that it can distort this process of planting
constitutional values on the Court and building a constitutional consensus. An offcenter, unrepresentative President will try to plant off-center, unrepresentative
constitutional values on the Court. If an off-center, unrepresentative Senate
cooperates with that endeavor, we face a significant problem for democracy and
for constitutional consensus building, particularly given the increasingly lengthy
terms served by the Justices.
This Symposium invited participants to think about reforms or adaptations
that would improve institutional performance in polarized times. This Article does
so without a concern for the likelihood of their adoption. This was, ironically, a
product of an initial pessimism about the reform enterprise. After all, any reform
would need to be adopted by America’s gridlocked political process—a highly
unlikely outcome. Instead of giving up and dispensing with the entire exercise,
however, this Article chooses to accept the invitation and freely and openly
consider a variety of reforms that could aid and support representational,
consensus-building processes.
To that end, the remainder of this Part discusses three types of reforms that (a)
increase and regularize turnover on the Court, (b) promote the appointment of
more representative Justices, and (c) help to elect more representative presidents
and senators. These reforms do not seek to weaken the partisan and electoral forces
that operate on the Court since those forces help to keep judicial review
democratically accountable. Rather, they aim to improve the way they work in an
increasingly polarized environment.
Supreme Court Turnover. It seems logical to expect that successful party
regimes will inevitably and regularly receive appointment opportunities that enable
them to shape the Court. The historical record tells a different story. Because
Article III leaves the Justices free to depart whenever they please, the timing of
of the Supreme Court, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politi
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133
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vacancies is left nearly to chance. That is especially true for “distal” vacancies—
those in which a President is able to “move the Court median” because the
departing Justice resides at or on the opposite side of the Court median from the
president. 135 Some presidents have been granted no vacancies at all (President
Carter) or no distal vacancies, even when winning two terms (Presidents
Eisenhower, Clinton and, thus far, Obama). Other presidents have been blessed
with multiple vacancies (President Reagan) or even multiple distal vacancies
(President Kennedy), even when lacking partisan control of Congress (Presidents
Nixon and H.W. Bush).
The problem with this unequal distribution of appointment opportunities is
that the process by which the Court is regularly “refreshed” with new values either
moves too fast or too slow. The values and preferences expressed in multiple
elections might be underrepresented on the Court if no vacancies occur, as was the
case during an eleven-year span from 1994 to 2005. Values and preferences
expressed in a single election, like President Nixon’s in 1968, might receive more
representation than they deserve, for example, with the four distal vacancies
President Nixon received in his first term. 136 This is especially problematic if
extreme party elites have momentarily gained power yet are able to gain long-term
representation of their constitutional views.
Several law professors have proposed solving this problem by replacing life
tenure with eighteen-year staggered terms, enabling a new Justice to be appointed
every two years. 137 Regularized turnover would equalize presidential influence
over the Court and tie its membership and policy direction directly and consistently
to presidential election outcomes. It also offers a safeguard in polarized times;
should extreme partisan elites momentarily gain power, chance could not bless
them with multiple appointment opportunities since those must be earned with
multiple election victories.
More Representative Supreme Court Appointees. There is sizable literature
advancing the idea that the judicial selection process is broken; complaints mostly
focus on Senate confirmation, especially the high level of partisan rancor; endless
delays and gridlock; and the lack of meaningful dialogue and debate. 138 Reform
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proposals abound and include banning the judicial filibuster, 139 hiring expert
counsel to question nominees, 140 generating better questions, 141 expediting
confirmation for nominees drawn from a Senate-approved list, 142 eliminating
televised Senate hearings, 143 adopting a supermajority requirement, 144 and even
electing Supreme Court Justices. 145
If political feasibility is not an issue, we might first consider whether the
Senate is even the appropriate institution to confirm judicial nominees. Equal state
representation is a significant representational distortion, one that, according to
Professors Frances Lee and Bruce Oppenheimer, has enabled more conservative
Supreme Court Justices like Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito to be
appointed than would have resulted from a more representative body. 146 Some
might consider the House to be superior in this respect. However, it also suffers
from partisan polarization and a strong localistic perspective that might render it
even less effective than the Senate in a confirmation role. The better solution might
be to improve the representational qualities of the Senate.
Of all the proposals to improve the Senate confirmation process, the most
promising is a supermajority vote requirement of either three-fifths or two-thirds.
This change is intended to encourage presidents to choose more confirmable and,
thus, presumably more consensual, nominees. Some argue that we already have, in
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effect, a two-thirds requirement given the ever-present filibuster threat. 147 With
only one exception, however—the nomination of Associate Justice Abe Fortas for
the Chief Justice seat in 1968—the filibuster has only been used for lower-court
nominees, not Supreme Court nominees. 148 This has it exactly backwards. It is the
Supreme Court, with its greater power to set constitutional policy, whose nominees
demand a higher level of Senate approval compared to lower-court nominees. 149
So what difference would a supermajority requirement have made with
respect to recent Supreme Court appointments? A three-fifths rule requiring sixty
senators to confirm would have kept both Justices Alito and Thomas off the bench,
as the former received only fifty-eight votes and the latter only fifty-two votes;
perhaps those seats would have gone to more moderate nominees. 150 In addition to
Justices Alito and Thomas, a two-thirds confirmation rule requiring sixty-seven
votes would have kept Justice Kagan (with only sixty-three votes) off the Court, as
well as Justice Rehnquist (with only sixty-five votes) out of the Chief Justice
seat. 151 Because a higher threshold would change the dynamics of the confirmation
process, it could also have put Justices Sotomayor and Rehnquist (as associate
Justice) at risk for Senate rejection, as they each received only sixty-eight votes. 152
A supermajority rule is intended to encourage presidents to avoid choosing
extreme or controversial Supreme Court nominees and to favor more moderate and
mainstream candidates who are likely to command Senate support. For example,
even a three-fifths requirement could have convinced President Reagan not to
nominate Robert Bork and offer instead a more moderate candidate, which of
course the Senate ultimately required him to do. 153 An underlying assumption of
147
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advocates of a supermajority rule is that it is the president’s aggressive nomination
practices that have triggered partisan warfare in the Senate confirmation process; 154
thus, it is his behavior that must be altered. The important question is whether a
supermajority rule will result in moderate or consensual nominees or just more
bloodshed and stalemate. As Professors Sarah Binder and Forrest Maltzman point
out, that depends critically on the ideological distribution of senators. 155 A bellshaped distribution would likely compel the President to select a more moderate
nominee satisfactory to the sixtieth senator. 156 A more polarized (i.e., bipolar)
distribution would not necessarily convince the President to select a more
consensual nominee appealing to the sixtieth senator since that senator might, in
addition to belonging to the opposite party, be significantly more distant
ideologically. 157 Another reason a supermajority rule might not produce the desired
effect is that some presidents may care more about appealing to their party’s base
than confirmation success; such presidents would not be affected by a
supermajority rule. 158 Because of these uncertainties, a three-fifths requirement is a
more modest and less risky change than a two-thirds rule.
Elect More Representative Presidents and Senators. The final set of reforms
looks outside the courts, recognizing that changing courts requires changing the
political institutions that construct them. The proposals of greatest interest here are
those that seek to produce more representative elected officials, as they will in turn
appoint more representative Justices. This might mean independent redistricting
commissions that redraw House district lines with an eye toward electoral
competition and effective representation, rather than incumbent safety and district
homogeneity. Many scholars and commentators regard the representational
distortions in the Senate as the most profound and enduring democratic defect in
American politics. Abolishing the Senate outright or altering the basis of
representation to promote greater equality in representation are both interesting
possibilities. Another likely target of reformers concerned with growing
polarization is the presidential nomination process. Currently, ideologically
extreme voters and organized interests dominate the process, enhancing the
prospects of candidates who are off-center and hurting the chances of those who
are more moderate and representative. Finally, compulsory voting is advanced as a
reform that could force more Americans to the polls, expanding the electorate and,
thereby, diluting the influence of extreme voters. 159 All of these reforms aim in the
right direction, helping to elect more representative presidents and senators.
154
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CONCLUSION
Democracy-assisting judicial review is a theme that has recently reemerged in
normative constitutional scholarship. It asks the Supreme Court to use its power to
vindicate the people’s views that have been stymied by a dysfunctional political
process, a problem that has worsened in recent years. The main deficiency in this
prescription is that it overstates the Court’s ability to compensate for problems like
polarization and gridlock since it is a part of the interbranch strategies employed
by partisan regimes. This was demonstrated in the area of reapportionment,
typically seen as a classic example of democracy-assisting judicial review. It is
also evident in recent Roberts Court decisions in the election-law field.
This Article recommends abandoning the democracy-assisting idea and
instead exploring ways to prevent the Court from being enlisted in extreme and
unrepresentative causes. Reform ideas should focus on increasing and regularizing
turnover on the Court and encouraging the selection of more representative
Justices, an outcome made more likely by increasing the representativeness of the
elected officials who choose the Justices. Absent a crisis, of course, it is highly
unlikely that any such reforms will be adopted. Nonetheless, it is a worthwhile
exercise to think about how to enhance representational and consensus-building
processes in the presence of growing partisan polarization. And it is a more
valuable exercise than simply imploring the Justices be less partisan or suggesting
that they defer to today’s laws that represent such fragile legislative compromises.
Institutions and processes, and the incentives they create, must be changed if
behavior is to be changed. The best we can do for the Court and for American
democracy in 2020 and beyond is to construct better electoral processes that
produce more representative leaders who, in turn, select more representative
Justices, which aids the quest for true constitutional consensus.

generally MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, IS VOTING FOR YOUNG PEOPLE? (3rd ed. 2011)
(advocating compulsory voting).

